April, X934

ANNOUNCEMENT
The REVIEW takes pleasure in announcing the election of Solomon Freedman to the Editorial Board, and Harry L. Clark, George S. Friedman, and
Elliot M. Winer to the Business Board. The REvIEW also announces the resigna-

tion of Solomon Freedman from the Business Board.
NOTES
NEBBIA V. PEOPLE: A MILESTONE-In January and March, 1933, the
Supreme Court of the United States rendered two decisions which are bound
to rank in importance with the famous cases of constitutional law. The first of
these cases, Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,' held that in time
of economic emergency a state statute does not impair the obligation of contracts
or violate due process by extending the time within which the "equity of redemption" could be exercised.
The second case, Nebbia v. People,2 decided that for a business admittedly
not a public utility the state legislature can enact laws authorizing the fixing of
prices and other regulation of that industry, and that the courts will not set
aside such laws or orders issued thereunder as denying due process unless they
are "arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference
with individual liberty."
This decision is important not because it enunciates new principles of constitutional law, but because it applies existing principles in a different way, and
marks distinctly a change from recent conceptions of due process. This change
is so great as to overrule for all practical purposes a host of cases decided in
recent years under the due process clause.
The Facts
In the winter of 1933 the Legislature of New York established a Milk
Control Board with power, among other things, to "fix minimum . . . and
maximum . . . retail prices to be charged by . . . stores to consumers ex-

cept for consumption on the premises where sold". 3 The Board fixed 9 as
the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia, the proprietor
of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a 50 loaf of bread for
i8o and was convicted for violating the Board's order on the theory that giving
a gratuity amounted to a cutting in his price. At his trial he asserted the statute
and order contravened the equal protection clause and the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and he renewed the contention in successive
appeals to the county court and the Court of Appeals. Both overruled his
claim and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States
did likewise.

IU. S. L. W., Jan. 9, 1934, at 381. This decision was the subject of an article in this
REvimW, and needs no further comment. See Corwin, Moratorho over Minnesota (1934)
82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 311.
0 U. S. L. W., March 6, 1934, at 551. Both decisions were by a 5 to 4 vote, and in each
case the members of the majority and minority were the same. The majority members were
Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo, and the opinions
were written by the Chief Justice, in the Blaisdell case, and Mr. Justice Roberts in the Nebbia case. Strong dissenting opinions were written in each case by Justices Sutherland and
McReynolds, respectively.
'N. Y. Laws of 1933, c. 158, § 312 (b).
(61g)
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The Court gave little consideration to the argument as to equal protection,
and approached the question whether such an act violated due process as
follows: four pages of the opinion were devoted to a discussion of the economic
situation in the state of New York, the careful investigation of the subject which
had been made by a legislative committee and the care with which the legislature
had considered the legislation. The Court then pointed out the fact that the
milk industry, next to common carriers, has been more subject to state regulation
under the police power than any other industry, due to its relation to the public health.
From that point on the Court developed the theory that in the exercise of
the police power for the general welfare, price regulation does not differ from
any other regulation. The Court pointed out that it has sustained as a valid
regulation under the police power of the states the regulation of banks, insurance, physicians, dentists, employment agencies, public weighers of grain, real
estate brokers, bill boards, party walls, the height of buildings, zoning laws, the
size of loaves of bread and of packages of food, the sale of cigarettes, the sale
of spectacles, private detectives, grain brokers, the business of renting automobiles to be used by the lessee upon the public streets, the sales of stock or grain
on margin, the conduct of pool and billiard rooms by aliens or ordinary persons,
the sale of liquor, the business of soliciting claims by any one not an attorney,
the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, and many other businesses and
activities. The opinion called particular attention to state usury laws which fix
a maximum price to be paid for the loan of money and which have always been
held constitutional. The Court held that if such regulation is proper, there is
no distinction between that regulation and the regulation of prices. In this
connection the Court said:
"If the law-making body within its sphere of government concludes
that the conditions or practices in an industry make unrestricted competition an inadequate safeguard of the consumer's interests . . . produce

waste harmful to the public, threaten ultimately to cut off the supply of a
commodity needed by the public or portend the destruction of the industry
itself, appropriate statutes passed in an honest effort to correct the threatened consequences may not be set aside because the regulation adopted fixes
prices reasonably deemed by the legislature to be fair to those engaged in
the industry and to the consuming public. And this is especially so where,
as here, the economic maladjustment is one of price, which threatens harm
to the producer at one end of the series and the consumer at the other.
The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his business
in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any
substantial group of the people. Price control, like any other form of
regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence
an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty." 4
Emergency Doctrine Disregarded
The opinion is notable from a technical point of view not only because it
disregarded the so-called emergency doctrine, but also because it relied for its
principles chiefly upon a case decided in 1876.' It has been thought by most
commentators and stated in practically all arguments before various courts that
this type of price fixing legislation, which had so often been declared unconstitutional, would only be sustained on an emergency basis for a limited period, as
'Nebbia v. People, supra note 2, at 556.
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
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principally set forth in the cases of Wilson v. New 6 and Block v. Hirsh.7 It is
therefore interesting to note that the Court has not relied on the economic
emergency or on the temporary character of the legislation, but has gone much
further and has placed the decision solely on the ground that the state has a
right to pass price fixing legislation as part of its police power whenever the
welfare of its citizens reasonably demands it.
Emphasis on Early Decisions
In its decision the Court relied principally on the case of Munn v. Illinois,"
decided in 1876. The significance to be attached to the three page discussion
of this case is great and will be much emphasized by students of jurisprudence.
As has been brilliantly pointed out by Charles Grover Haines ' the approach
of the Court to the due process clause has not always been the same. As originally passed, the Fourteenth Amendment was designed primarily to protect
the negro race in its newly acquired rights and privileges, and the early Supreme Court decisions adopted that view.' 0 One of the first attempts made
to secure protection under the due process clause from legislative regulation
of private business was in the Munn case, and the Court refused to accept the
extended application of "due process of law" contended for by the business
interests involved." Shortly thereafter, the philosophy of the country began
to change and the economic doctrine of laissez-faire, propounded chiefly by
Adam Smith 12 received increasing support. It was soon being urged on the
Court that private rights of property must be protected from legislative control
and that the due process clause was the medium through which this should be
done.' 8 The Court gradually adopted this view and there began that trend of
decisions which limited the state legislatures in their power over liberty and
14
property and culminated in such decisions as Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
5
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of IndustrialRelations, Lochner v. New York,""
18
17
Willians
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,
Tyson & Brother v. Banton,19
20
Liebnmann.
v.
Co.
Ice
v. Standard Oil Co. of La., and New State
These later decisions uniformly held that price fixing and regulation of
hours and wages in businesses not affected with a public interest was unconsti6243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
7256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (92).

See also Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391,
14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894), where the testimony showed that the business was keenly competitive, and that nevertheless price regulation was proper.
8
9

Supra note 5.
HAINES, THE REvvAL OF NATURAl. LANv CONCEPTS (1930).

Slaughter House Cases, 16 U. S. 36 (1872) ; Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment (909) 7 MICH. L. REv. 643.
'See supra note 5.
"SmITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIoi s (1776) Bk. I, c. IO.
ISee the argument of Joseph H. Choate in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157
U. S. 429, 532 (1895). See also CooLE r,6 Co sTrruToNAL LImrFATIONs (2d ed. 1871) 4,
where the author favors the doctrine that "there are on all sides definite limitations which

circumscribe the legislative authority, aside from the specific restrictions which the people
impose by their constitutions".
'4261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (923).
I262

IGI8

U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 63o (1923).

U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (9o5).

'7273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
is274 U. S. I, 47 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (1927).
I278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (1929).
co285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
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tutional as violative of due process, and that "affected with a public interest"
meant in effect, "touched with a public use". A short quotation from the last
mentioned case will illustrate this point.
"It [the ice business] is a business as essentially private in its nature
as the business of the grocer, the dairyman, the butcher, the baker, the
and this Court has definitely said that the
shoemaker, or the tailor . .
production or sale of food or clothing cannot be subjected to legislative
regulation on the basis of a public use." 1'
Importance of the Opinion
The present opinion, then, is vitally important because it reverses the trend.
The cases cited above are skipped over, and on their facts practically overruled,
the Court going back to the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois. The law now is that
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of
the police power" and all businesses may be subject to the exercise of the police
power if the legislature reasonably states that the public welfare is involved.
Mr. Justice Roberts amplifies this thought as follows:
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and
to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are
without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by
the legislative arm, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied . . .
'Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a wise
and wholesome rule for trade and commerce is an economic question which
this court need not consider or determine.'"
"It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest, and the function of courts in the application
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case
whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable
authority or condemn it as arbitrary or disexertion of governmental
2
criminatory".
Under this decision, therefore, insofar as the due process clause is concerned, it is possible that a state may legally regulate all its businesses even to
the extent of fixing prices, wages and hours of labor. Business has lost a large
part of the protection it believed the Fourteenth Amendment gave it.
The decision marks the change from an era of laissez faire to an era of
governmental regulation. It evidences the fact that to a great mass of our
people security has become more important than unrestricted opportunity. It
means that the philosophy and therefore the approach, or as the philosophers
call it, the values of the erstwhile minority led by Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
who so long advocated complete freedom of the states in economic and social
legislation, has now become that of the majority. It means further that in so
far as the due process clause is concerned the doctrines advocated in The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes 23 are now the law of the land.
Id. at 277, 52 Sup. Ct. at 374.
Nebbia v. People, supra note 2, at 555.
(1929).
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Effect on N. R. A. and A. A. A.
In conclusion, inquiry must be made as to what effect, if any, this decision
has upon the constitutionality of such federal legislation as the N. R. A. and
the A. A. A. First, it is clear that this decision is not direct authority for the
constitutionality of federal legislation. The Court here decided that a price
fixing statute was proper state legislation under the police power.
Second, it is equally clear that the decision throws a light upon the
philosophy which now governs the Court and shows that the Court is not
unduly distressed by the thought of government control over so-called economic
laws.
Third, the Court in its opinion gave a clue when it said, "Thus has this
court from the early days affirmed that the power to promote the general welfare
is inherent in government. Touching the matters committed to it by the Constitution, the United States possesses the power, as do the states in their
sovereign capacity touching all subjects, jurisdiction of which is not surrendered
to the federal government."
Therefore, the question as to the N. R. A. and A. A. A. and other "new
deal" legislation is left largely as this: "Can these acts properly be brought
within a delegated power or a power reasonably to be implied therefrom ?" If
they can, the fact that they contemplate price regulation, wage regulation or
any other regulation of business or the fact that violation of the act is a criminal
offense, is immaterial. Such regulation will be due process unless "arbitrary,
discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free
to adopt".
Insofar as the N. R. A. and the A. A. A. are concerned the Court must now
determine whether it will extend the "commerce clause" to include a myriad
of intrastate transactions. It may well be that having determined that the states
have practically complete power within their sphere, the Court will hesitate to
extend the "commerce clause" beyond its obvious intent. On the other hand,
treating the Constitution as a living document and taking into consideration
the speed of modern communication and the unity of our nation, the Court may
say that everything affecting interstate commerce may be regulated as a part of
interstate commerce. To so decide they will have to extend the "commerce
clause" and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment further than ever
before.
The Court, having gone back to the early decisions under the Fourteenth
the
Amendment, may well return for support to the early decisions under
"commerce clause", many of which, beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden,2' upheld
the theory of a wider federal control.
A further possibility is that the Court may decide, if not now then at some
time in the future, that the Constitution delegated to the federal government
the powers of a sovereign nation, which powers have been defined in the law
of nations, and are sufficient to justify legislation for the welfare of the people
as a whole, particularly in matters which, by reason of changing economic and
social conditions, cannot be handled effectively by the individual states. To the
narrow constructionist such a thought is equivalent to scrapping the Constitution. To many liberal thinkers it would merely be carrying into effect their
conception of the Constitution as a living document sufficient at all times to meet
the needs of our people under changed conditions.
MORIS D UANE.f
t Member of the Philadelphia Bar.
U. S. i (1824).
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CRIMINALITY IN THE ASYLUM AS A REQUIREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ExTRADITIoN-The subject of extradition has been brought into public promi-

nence by two recent episodes: the attempt of the United States to procure the
surrender of Samuel Insull from Greece,' and the effort of Great Britain to
extradite John Factor from this country. The latter, if less notorious, involved
a more serious problem and resulted in a decision of far-reaching consequence.
In the case of Factorv. Laubenheinwr 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that the Government was "bound by treaty to surrender its citizens and
others to England there to be prosecuted criminally and punished for that which
if committed here would transgress no law-federal or state".3 This decision is
something of a revolution in the history of international extradition. Hitherto
it had apparently been taken for granted that it was implied in every extradition
treaty that an offense to be extraditable must be a crime both in the demanding
country and in the country of asylum. Only two previous American cases had
involved the question, both in the lower federal courts. Although one of these
cases decided the point substantially as in the Factor case, 4 the other appears
directly contra,' and the requirement of mutual criminality has been reiterated
in numerous dictaby the Supreme Court and the lower courts, and in the writings
of eminent publicists.8 The recent decision therefore invites an inquiry into two
questions, one judicial, the other political: (I) Do the treaties with Great Britain,
under which Factor's extradition was sought, properly permit the interpretation
placed upon them by the Court? (2) To what extent should governments, in
providing for extradition, require criminality in the asylum as a condition?

I
The treaties involved in the Factor case are the treaty of 1842 with Great
Britain 7 and the supplementary convention of 1889.8 The former provided for
the mutual surrender of persons charged with any of a number of enumerated
criminal offenses.'
The convention of 1889 added to the list of extraditable
offenses.' 0 Factor was apprehended in Illinois on the complaint of the British
'See Note (1933) 31 MIcH. L. Rxv. 544.
a54 Sup. Ct. 191 (1933). A dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Butler, in
which Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Roberts concurred.
' These are the words of the dissenting Justice. Id. at i99.
'In re Metzger, 17 Fed. Cas. 232 (S. D. N. Y. 1847) (holding extradition permissible
under a treaty with France, though the acts charged were not criminal in New York, the
state of asylum).
I1n re Frank, io7 Fed. 272 (D. Ore. i90) (holding that extradition could not be permitted under a treaty with Great Britain because the acts charged, though falling within the
treaty offense of "embezzlement", were not criminal in Oregon, the state of asylum).
"See Wright v. Henkel, 390 U. S. 40, 58, 23 Sup. Ct. 781, 785 (1903) ; Kelly v. Griffin,
241 U. S. 6, 14, 36 Sup. Ct. 487, 489 (1915) ; Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 311, 42 Sup. Ct.
469, 471 (922) ; Muller's Case, 17 Fed. Cas. 975, 976 (E. D. Pa. 1863) ; Cohn v. Jones, oo

Fed. 639, 645 (S. D. Iowa i9oo) ; United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 766, 770 (S. D. Ga.
19o6) ; Powell v. United States, 206 Fed. 400, 403 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913) ; United States v.
Moore, 46 F. (2d) 308, 310 (E. D. N. Y. ig3o) ; Bernstein v. Gross, 58 F. (2d) 154, 155
(C. C. A. 5th, 1932); BIoRt AND CHsALMERS, EXTRADITION (I903) ii; I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922)
570; I MOORE, EXTRADITION (1891) io6n, 112; PIGOrT, EXTRADITION
(I9IO) l09; Brierly, Report of Sub-committee on EXtradition, League of Natiols (1926) 20
Am. J. INT. L. 242. But cf. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457 (1888).
'Art. x deals with extradition. I MALLoY, TREATIES (i910) 65o, 655.
' Id. at 740.

. . . murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper."
"

The list included the offense charged in the principal case:

".

.

.

receiving any

money, valuable security, or other property, knowing the same to have been embezzled, stolen,
or fraudulently obtained." Art. i, par. 3.
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government charging him with the crime of receiving money knowing it to have
been fraudulently obtained, an offense listed in the convention of 1889. On a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus the District Court ordered Factor discharged,
on the ground that the acts charged were not a crime in Illinois." The Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed this holding on the ground that the acts charged did
constitute a crime in that state. 2 It is interesting to note that neither of these
courts disputed Factor's basic contention that the acts charged must constitute a
crime by the laws of Illinois, the state of asylum; the District Court based its
decision on this contention, and the Circuit Court of Appeals expressly conceded
it. 13 On appeal to the Supreme Court this position was for the first time seriously
attacked by counsel for the British government; and the Court, apparently admitting that the laws of Illinois did not make the offense a crime, 14 held that criminality in the asylum was not necessary under the treaties, and affirmed the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Although some doubt exists with reference to the question, it may be conceded that both the duty' 5 and the power'" of the American government to
extradite alleged criminals rests solely upon the treaties which it contracts with
foreign nations. The treaties involved in the Factor case, like most American
treaties on the subject, contain no general provision expressly requiring criminality in both countries.' 7 It is therefore necessary to inquire whether the treaty
will in any other way permit the construction that such a condition is required.
It is an accepted principle that treaties are to be construed according to the intention of the contracting governments 1--an intention to be ascertained not only
from the language of the treaties, but from all the circumstances attending the
negotiation thereof which may reveal the purpose of the parties.' 9 The only
language which might possibly be construed as indicating an intention to condition
extradition on criminality in the asylum is the provision requiring that the laws
of the asylum shall be the test of the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant hold'The decision of the District Court is unreported. The information is taken from the
report of the case on appeal. See principal case at 192.
"Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932). The court relied principally upon Kelly v. Griffin, supra note 6, which held that the acts constituted a crime in
Illinois.
"Supra note 12, at 629.
"There is no express admission to this effect, but since the court went to great length
to dispose of the principal contention, which would be unnecessary if the. crime existed in

Illinois, the admission may be safely implied. It is so stated in the dissenting opinion. See

principal case at 2Ol.
' Grotius and Vattel apparently considered the surrender of fugitivel criminals an international obligation. GRo'nus, DE JuRE BT.LI Er PAcls (1625) bk. II, c. 21, §§ 3, 4 [translation in CLARKE, ExTRADITIIoN (4 th ed. 1903) 2]; VATTELI LE DROIT DEs GE-,s (1758) bk.
II, c. 6, §§ 76, 77 [translation in CLARKE, sztpra at 3]. See Matter of Washburn, 4 Johns. Ch.
io6, io8 (N. Y. 1819). The weight of modern opinion is to the contrary. See United States
v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 412, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 236 (1886) ; principal case at 193; I MooRE,
at 13; I HYDE, at 567, both op. cit. supra note 6. But see CLARKE, supra at 14.
"6See United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner 482, 486 (C. C. Mass. 1837) ; i Moolx, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 21.
'1A
few American treaties contain express provisions requiring mutual criminality:
Great Britain, for Philippines and Guam and British Borneo (1913), 3 SEN. Doc. No. 348,
67th Cong., 4th Sess., at 2637. Austria, 46 STAT. 2779 (1930) ; Germany, 47 STAT. 74 (1931).
Compare the provisions in a number of treaties to the effect that extradition will not be

granted when the crime, because of statutory limitation, is unpunishable by the laws of the

asylum: Netherlands (i88o), 2 MALLoY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1261; Luxemberg (1883),
i id. at 1053; Argentina (1896), i id. at 25; Denmark (19o2), i id. at 39o; France (19o9),
3 SEN. Doc. No. 348, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., at 2580.
"See In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 475, Ii Sup. Ct. 897, 904 (i8gi) ; Hyde, Interpretation
of Treaties by the Supreme Court of the United States (ig29) 23 Am. J. INT. L. 824.
See id. at 827.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

ing the fugitive for extradition. Such evidence is required as "would justify
his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offense had there
been committed"."0 It is conceded that this refers only to evidence of the facts
alleged, not to the law determining the criminal nature of the facts; 11 but it is
urged that the language used indicates an understanding by the parties that
criminality is to be tested by the laws of the asylum.2 2 While it is possible to
read into the clause a tacit understanding that the crime could be committed in
the place of asylum, there seems little justification for the conclusion that the
parties intended to make such a condition a binding term of the treaties.
In the absence of treaty language which could reasonably be construed as
expressing an intention to require criminality in the asylum, the "burden of proof"
would seem to be upon those contending that an intention thus to restrict extradition should be implied from circumstances outside the terms of the treaties.
But circumstances attending the negotiation of the treaties involved in the Factor
case afford little convincing evidence of the parties' intention. In 1842, when the
basic treaty with Great Britain was drafted, the practice of extradition for nonpolitical crimes was in the first years of development. It was one of the first
treaties of the kind entered into by the United States or any country.2 These
circumstances may point to the conclusion that both people and governments were
suspicious of the practice, and would be unlikely to extend the privilege of extradition to conduct not criminal in the asylum. But the evidence of such a feeling
is extremely meager. Mr. Moore states that the treaty of 1842 "awoke violent
opposition in the United States", '4 but he gives no authority for the statement.
The newspapers of the period are silent upon the subject, 25 indicating that it did
not loom very large in the public mind. That the problems of extradition did
not greatly disturb the diplomats and legislators is apparent from the fact that
the subject of extradition is treated in but one article, the tenth, of a comprehensive treaty dealing with
subjects which were probably far more important at the
2 6
time than extradition.

Nothing more appears either from the treaties themselves or the circumstances surrounding their negotiation which might reveal an intention of the
parties to require criminality in the asylum. Other arguments are concerned
with the subsequent opinions of authorities. The virtual unanimity of opinion
in favor of the requirement among publicists and American courts has already
been noted."' The view taken by the governments and courts of Great Britain
and other parts of the British Empire is especially entitled to consideration. It
is clearly the policy of the British government,28 as well as the opinion of the
oTreaty of 1842, art. x, supra note 7.
See principal case at 194 and 203.
I at 203 ; I HYDE, loc. cit. supra note 6.
Id.
= See i MOORE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8 et seq.
1 id. at 12, see also 2 id. at 1059.
I4
See N. Y. Weekly Tribune, Dec. IO,1842, at I; North American, Dec. 3, 1842, at 2,
Dec. 8, 1842, at 2, Dec. 9,1842, at 2; Public Ledger, Dec. 8, 1842, at 2. In all these newspapers reference is made to the treaty of 1842, and though there is comment upon the questions of the slave trade and boundaries (also dealt with in the treaty) no mention is made of
extradition.
' Settlement of boundary disputes and suppression of the slave trade. See i MAZtLoy,
loc. cit. supra note 7.
-1Supra note 6.
"Extradition crime" is defined by statute as a "crime which, if committed in England
or within English jurisdiction, would be one of the crimes described". Extradition Act, 33
& 34 VIcr. c. 52, § 26 (187o). See also First Schedule of the Act. The Canadian statute is
21

to the same effect. 2 REV. STAT. (1886) C. 142, § 2 (b).
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courts, 2 that extradition will not be granted unless the offense charged is a crime

in the asylum. Since it cannot reasonably be supposed that the British authorities
would deliberately refuse to carry out the terms of the treaties, it must be assumed
that they construe the treaties as supporting their position. This is a responsible
expression of opinion as to the construction by the representatives of one of the
parties to the treaties here involved." But it should be borne in mind that even
authoritative opinions, though entitled to consideration, have no direct bearing
upon the primary problem of ascertaining the parties' intention. Moreover it is
not unlikely that many of the non-judicial opinions go no further than to declare
the policy which governments have pursued or ought to pursue in making arrangements for extradition, and do not attempt to set forth the law as defined by the
treaties.
Considering all the circumstances the most plausible conclusion is that the
parties entertained no intention upon the matter one way or the other. The
governments, in drafting the treaty in 1842, doubtless were thinking of extradition only in respect to the offenses therein enumerated, all of which were
universally recognized as criminal. 8 The most that can be said is that if the
parties had thought of the question they probably would have intended to include
the requirement. The conclusion seems proper that the treaties should be read as
they stand, without implying any provisions as to mutual criminality.
The majority of the Court does not dispose of the case in this way, but
indulges in elaborate arguments to justify its decision. The first point made is
that since neither of the treaties in question contains any blanket provision
requiring criminality in both countries for all offenses, and since some of the
enumerated offenses (not including that with which Factor was charged) are
qualified by the expression "made criminal by the laws of both countries" or its
equivalent, 32 the parties must have intended to limit the qualification to those
offenses.3 3 In the phrase quoted, the Court reaches its conclusion by stressing the
words "both countries". A slight shift in emphasis removes the whole force of
the argument: if, instead, the word "criminal" is stressed, the expression can
quite as easily be explained as a caveat, emphasizing the principle that only such
violations of the law as amount to crimes are subject to extradition proceedings.
This is clearly applicable to the offense of "fraud", a generic term including
purely civil as well as criminal wrongs.3 4
The point made by the Court as to the statement of Secretary of State
Calhoun that the treaty (of 1842) does not require criminality in the asylum 35
' Rex v. Governor [1912] 3 K. B. 568; Re Staggs, 22 W. L. R. 853 (Can. 1912); Rex
v. Garvey, 6 N. Z. L. R. 630 (1888); cf. In re Windsor, 6 B. & S. 522 (I865); see Re
Bellencoutre, 17 Cox C. C. 253, 263 (18gi); In re Arton [1896] i Q. B. 509, 517; In re
Collins, ii B. C. R. 436, 446 (Can. 1905) ; In re Smith, 4 Practice Rep. 215, 216 (Can. 1868).
But see Re Phipps, i Ont. R. 586, 6op (Can. 1882).
This is not the argument of the dissenting Justice, who contended that the principle of
reciprocity would be violated if the treaty were construed so as to obligate the United States
to extradite for offenses not criminal in the asylum because "admittedly England did not so
agree". See principal case at 201. This argument is unsound because it is not admitted that
England so agreed, and the argument therefore begs that important question. That England
later thought it had so agreed is a different matter.
Supra note 9.
The qualified offenses, all in the convention of 1889, are: "Fraud by bailee, banker,
agent, factor, trustee, or director or member or officer of any company, made criminal by the
laws of both countries ;" "Crimes or offenses against the laws of both countries for the suppression of slavery and slave-trading;" and "participation in any of the crimes mentioned . . . provided such participation be punishable by the laws of both countries". Art.
i, convention of 1889, supra note 8.
See principal case at i95.

See argument of counsel in Wright v. Henkel, supra note 6, at 56.
Principal case at 196.
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seems to be of little weight. As the dissenting Justice points out, 86 the statement
was made under peculiar circumstances prompting the Secretary to interpret the
treaty so as to obtain the extradition of a fugitive slave. But even accepting this
as an authoritative expression of the American stand on this question at that
time, the United States, if it reversed its position in the instant case, would be
guilty of no greater inconsistency than is embodied in the English contention.
The Court also invokes a rule of construction, stated and applied in earlier
cases, that "if a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the
rights which may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it [sic] the more
liberal construction is to be preferred".Y7 It would seem that this principle is
properly applicable where an attempt has been made to express an intention, but
the result is an ambiguity, rather than where no intention is expressed or apparent,
as in the present case.
The arguments adduced by the Court do not materially strengthen its position. It is rather the weakness of the opposing arguments, the failure to show
any intention on the part of the contracting governments to require mutual criminality, that justifies the result reached. Because the meaning of the treaties is
so doubtful, it becomes increasingly important to inquire into the desirability of
the doctrine which the decision announces.
II
Treaty provisions aside, it is extraordinary that courts and legal writers
have stated it even as a principle of international policy that criminality in the
asylum is a prerequisite of extradition, with hardly a dispute or question of the
soundness and desirability of such a requirement. Rarely has the policy been
criticized, either favorably or adversely.38 The closest approach to a comprehensive inquiry into the question appears to be that of the British Royal Commissioners on Extradition in their report of 18789 This was a study of extradition, with criticisms of the practice at the time and recommendations for future
British policy. It was stated that an offense to be extraditable should be a crime
under English law.' 0 Two reasons were given for this position: that it is a
general principle of extradition that only offenses which it is to the common
interest of all nations to suppress should be extraditable; and that it is inconvenient to require committing magistrates, in determining whether an offense is
extraditable, to inquire into the law of the demanding nation. The inadequacy
of these explanations is apparent. Even if it is wise to limit extradition to classes
of offenses generally regarded as anti-social, 41 whether or not the law of one
country or locality condemns particular acts as crimes is no test of their undesirable character in general. The principal case is an apt illustration of this point.
MId.

at 205.

; Asakura
10 Sup. Ct. 295, 298 (89o)
Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 342, 44 Sup. Ct. 515, 516 (1923) ; Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U. S. 123,
127, 49 Sup. Ct. 47, 48 (1928).
1 Piggott observes that the "test [of the law of the asylum] is unscientific, and could
not have been adopted independent of convenience". Op. cit. supra note 6, at 24.
" Printed in FOREIGN RELATIONS (1878) 268. The commissioners included some of the
judges and lawyers of the day.
outstanding
40 Id. at 272.
"The practice of enumerating "extraditable offenses", ranging from specific crimes, like
murder, to broad classes of crimes, like offenses against the bankruptcy laws, seems to be a
vestige of the early days of extradition, which has outlived any function it may once have
had. Even admitting that there are certain types of offenses with which extradition should
not be concerned, such as those of a purely political or religious nature, these could be excluded from the operation of the treaties by clauses to that effect. A blanket undertaking to
extradite for any crime, with these exceptions, would achieve in a much simpler manner the
result intended by the cumbersome enumerations.

1Id. at 196; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 271,

v.
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The offense of knowingly receiving fraudulently obtained property might well be
42
The fact that for some reason it
denounced as criminal throughout the world.
is not a crime in Illinois does not make such conduct less anti-social outside that
state. As for the second point, it is obvious that authorities in one country are
put to no unusual or highly difficult task if they are required to determine foreign
law.4" This is a not uncommon judicial function, and if adequate evidence of
such law is offered (as may be required) no serious difficulty is presented. In
fact some inquiry into foreign law is necessary in any case, since extradition may
if the laws of the demanding country do not make the acts
be rightfully refused
44
charged criminal.

The real problem, involving a serious difficulty, is not mentioned in the
report. The requirement of mutual criminality operates as a check upon the
power of a foreign nation to demand extradition for conduct which, though
declared by it to be criminal, is not considered anti-social by the asylum country.
If the requirement were eliminated one nation could insist upon the participation
by another in the enforcement of laws which the latter might consider unjust.
Suppose, for example, that a nation for purposes of oppression should enact a
law which provides that upon the bankruptcy of a member of a specified minority
group his relatives shall be required to contribute their property to the fund for
creditors, and makes the evasion of this law a crime. 45 If a "criminal" under
such a statute sought refuge in another country his extradition could not rightfully be refused under a treaty which included without qualification the class of
offenses designated as "against the bankruptcy laws". The latter country would
thus become an instrument aiding in the enforcement of such laws.
The danger described would be inconsiderable if extradition were limited to
crimes existing at the time the treaty was made, since each nation would then
have the opportunity to investigate the state of the criminal law in the other, and
to draft the treaty accordingly. But extradition treaties are made with a consideration of the future and are generally held to permit extradition for conduct
within the designated classes, afterward made criminal 4q-a feature undoubtedly
desirable, since it would be highly impracticable to draft a new treaty at the
creation of each new offense for which it was thought extradition should be
granted. If the restriction of mutual criminality is removed, each nation has the
privilege of demanding extradition for any conduct which it makes criminal
before or after the treaty date, the only restriction being (as treaties are now
drafted) that the conduct must fall within one of the loosely designated classes
of offenses.
It would be idle to contend that there is no danger in such an extension of
power to foreign nations. But it is easy to exaggerate the harm which may
result. A government may create unjust and barbarous laws and within its own
borders punish their violators, enduring with little loss the resultant verbal criticism of the world. But the same government would think many times before it
asked another nation to aid it in the enforcement of such laws. The value of
' It is criminal by statute in many of the United States. See list in principal case at
I97n.
I See PIGGO7r, op. cit. supra note 6, at 24.
"In re Tully, 2o Fed. 812 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884).
" The imagination of Chief Justice Cockburn is even more vivid: "Suppose the local law
of New York were to say picking pockets shall be deemed robbery or murder, must we take
it so?" See ln re Windsor, supra note 29, at 527.
' There does not appear to be any express provision to this effect in the treaties, but the
courts by construction have reached that result. Muller's Case, supra note 6; United States
v. Hecht, 16 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ; Re Phipps, supra note 3g; see Cohn v. Jones,
supra note 6, at 645, 646. But see In re Gross, 43 Fed. 517, 519, 52o (E. D. N. C. 189o) ; cf.
In re Eno, io Q. L. M. 194 (Can. 1884).
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bringing an escaped criminal to punishment would hardly be worth the risk of
directly offending another nation by abusing the privilege it has accorded. This
consideration seems especially applicable to a great and influential nation like the
United States, whose good will is highly valued, in dollars and cents, if not in
more intangible terms. Moreover, an extradition treaty, like any other, can be
terminated. Most existing treaties provide for termination by either party at
will or on short notice.4 7 The power to suspend or revoke operates both as a
deterrent against abuse of the privilege and as a means of removing entirely the
power of abuse from an offending nation.
Past experience affords no ground for a fear of wholesale breach of trust
if the restriction of mutual criminality is removed. In the history of extradition
official objections to the manner in which the privilege has been exercised have
rarely if ever been made, 45 although almost as much opportunity for abuse is
present with the requirement of criminality in the asylum as without it. There
are no provisions in any treaty guaranteeing a fair trial of the accused, or insuring reasonable punishment. But these elementary principles of justice have
always been observed, as of course they are expected to be, though their observance is not expressly required. There is no more reason to expect that a nation
will enact outrageous laws and demand extradition for their breach than that
any other gross miscarriage of justice will be perpetrated. 49
Small as the real danger may be in eliminating the requirement of mutual
criminality, it is pertinent to inquire whether any advantages which may thereby
be gained are worth the risk of injurious consequences, whatever the extent of
the latter. Granting extradition irrespective of the laws of the asylum results,
however, in a number of important advantages. It more fully effectuates the
elemental purpose of extradition: the effective suppression of anti-social conduct
both at home and abroad.50 When a nation enters into a treaty of extradition
it both gains the privilege of requiring extradition and becomes obligated to
grant it. By acquiring the privilege to demand surrender of fugitive criminals
a nation is benefited because the administration of its own criminal system is
thereby facilitated. The importance of this function of extradition can hardly
be exaggerated. With modern conditions of swift and easy transportation the
effective administration of criminal justice would be all but impossible if persons
accused of crime could find an inviolable refuge in foreign lands.5 '
It seems clearly unwise to limit this valuable function of extradition to
offenses which have been defined as crimes by both countries involved. A glance
' Both art. x of the treaty of 1842 and the convention of 1889 are terminable at the will
of either party. Treaty of 1842, art. xi, MALLoY, loc. cit. supra note 7; convention of i889,
art. ix, MALLoY, supra note 8. The latest extradition treaty with Great Britain (not yet
promulgated by latter) provides for termination on six months' notice. 47 STAT. 2122 (1931),
art. i8. The recent treaty with Greece provides for one year's notice. 47 STAT. 2194 (93),
art. xiii.
' The writer has been unable to find a single case of abuse.
"The whole practice of extradition is founded upon the confidence of contracting nations in the justness of each other's criminal law and the reasonableness of its judicial administration. See Report of the Royal Commissioners, supra note 39, at 270; 1 HYDE, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 567. Lack of such confidence appears to be the reason for the refusal of
the American government to enter into an extradition treaty with China. See i MooRE, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 8in.
" The preamble of the treaty of i84z states that the arrangements for extradition are
"for the better administration of justice and the prevention of crime within the territories and
jurisdiction of the two parties". I MtLoy, op. cit. supra note 7, at 651. See Report of
Royal Commissioners, supra note 39, at 269.
61i MooRE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5. Fugitive criminals might be tried and punished
by the country of asylum; but this is obviously undesirable, and it is one of the objects of
extradition to avoid the necessity for such a practice. See i id. at 154.

NOTES
at any of the modern treaties reveals that the list of extraditable "offenses" ineludes classes of crimes which are of relatively recent origin in the law and which
are in the course of development, such as offenses against the bankruptcy and
customs laws and those involving breach of trust. 2 It is obvious that some
crimes of this nature are not universal among the nations of the world; the laws
of one country may denounce particular conduct within these classes as criminal,
while those of another may not. It is possible that the reason for the discrepancy
is a difference in the views of the two countries as to what is anti-social conduct.
But other explanations seem much more plausible: conduct of that particular kind
may be so infrequent in one country that the necessity for legislating against it
has not been brought to the attention of the government; or the legislature may
have been slow to enact the necessary statutes. It seems undesirable that one
engaging in such conduct in the country which has made it criminal should escape
punishment merely because he has fled to a country which, for one of the reasons
stated, has not recognized the crime. On the contrary, it is highly desirable from
the viewpoint of each nation that the fugitive be extradited, since the administration of criminal justice of the one is facilitated, and the other not only is rid of
a criminal 52 but enjoys the reciprocal privilege of demanding extradition when
the situation is reversed.
It should be kept in mind that the existence of such a situation is not a
remote possibility; it is probable today 1 and increasingly likely to arise in the
future as the criminal law expands. Moreover, it is precisely the persons who
commit the more "modern" offenses who are most apt to escape the local police.
It is the swindler, the embezzler, the criminal with "brains", rather than the thief
or murderer, who will seek refuge in a foreign country. To permit to any considerable extent such persons to escape trial and punishment might well have
serious consequences upon the administration of criminal justice and general
respect for law. It certainly would tend to defeat the basic purpose for which
extradition was instituted.55
Another consideration applicable to the case of countries like the United
States, where the criminal law is likely to differ in the various political subdivisions, is that the requirement of criminality in the asylum may lead to lack
of uniformity and reciprocity in administering extradition under each treaty.58
In the United States, in the absence of federal legislation covering the offense
involved, the "asylum" is considered to be the state in which the fugitive is
'See

for example the recent treaties with Cuba, 44

=ipranote 47; Honduras, 45 STAT. 2489 (1927).

STAT.

2392 (1926) ; Great Britain,

' "Criminal" in the general sense of a person of anti-social tendencies.
" The Factor case is itself a recent example. In the Insull case it seems that one of the
grounds for refusal of extradition by the Greek court was that the conduct in question did
not constitute "embezzlement" under Greek law (the treaty expressly providing that extradition for "embezzlement" should be granted only if the offense was punishable by both countries). See Note (1933) 31 MicH. L. REv. 557 n. 54.
' Few of the authorities recognize this inconsistency between the requirement of mutual
criminality and the purpose of extradition. Piggott observes that the requirement is "diametrically opposed to the fundamental principle of extradition". Op. cit. supra note 6, at log. See
In re Metzger, supra note 4, at 238.
Curiously enough, however, in condemning the practice prevalent among many nations of
exempting their own citizens from extradition, the authorities point with great eloquence to
the inconsistency between that practice and the basic objective of extradition. See Report of
Royal Commissioners, supra note 39, at 270, 271; 1 MOOR, op. cit. supra note 6, at I54;
statement of Secretary of State Blaine cited in i HYF, op. cit. supra note 6, at 578n; quotation from Pena, in Pente, Priwiples of InternationalExtradition in Latin America (193o)
28 MicH. L. Rzv. 665, 711.
' See Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 978, 979.
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found. 57 If extradition is to depend in each case upon the laws of the particular
state,58 the government will have to refuse extradition in some cases and grant
it in others involving the same offense and the same treaty. Since one of the
essential purposes for which extradition treaties are negotiated is to make the
obligation to surrender for a given offense as certain as possible, this resultJ
because it tends to defeat that purpose, is clearly undesirable. Moreover the
government will enjoy the privilege of demanding extradition for an offense
committed in a state which makes it criminal,55 even though it might not be
obligated to surrender a person who committed the same offense in the other
country. This failure of reciprocity violates a principle underlying all international dealings.
Conclusion
By eliminating the restriction of mutual criminality a nation both loses and
gains. By agreeing to extradite for conduct criminal in the foreign country but
not at home, it undertakes to aid in the enforcement of rules of conduct without
regard to its own public policy. Such a grant of power, like almost every extension of trust, necessarily involves a danger of abuse and consequently a risk of
harm. On the other hand such a step results in a number of valuable gains:
(i) each nation acquires the privilege to demand extradition for offenses which
are criminal by its laws, though not by the laws of the asylum, a privilege which
is becoming increasingly valuable because of the rapid development of new types
of crimes; (2) by extending extradition to cases of offenses criminal only in the
demanding country the administration of criminal law in foreign countries is
facilitated, thus promoting justice in general, and serving to maintain good will
among the nations; (3) in the case of nations having a diversity of criminal law
within their boundaries, uniformity of administration and reciprocity of obligation are achieved.
An intelligent choice of policy on this question should be based upon a balancing of these advantages and disadvantages. In the opinion of the writer the
gains well outweigh the losses. The latter, it should be remembered, are chiefly
in the form of risks of harm-possible, not necessary and immediate loss. Moreover, as has been pointed out, the danger involved is not so great as might perhaps be imagined. Most of the advantages to be gained, on the contrary, are
actual, substantial, and almost certain to be realized. The opportunity of reaching those committing the "new" types of crimes, who would otherwise escape
with impunity, appears vital to the continued growth of the criminal law, and
alone seems well worth the risk to which a nation might be exposed by increasing the extradition privileges of foreign governments.
The conclusion therefore seems inevitable that as a matter of policy criminality in the asylum ought not to be required. If the decision of the principal
case is followed this policy will be put into practice by the United States, except
in those cases which fall under the few treaties expressly requiring mutual criminality. This decision, therefore, whatever may be said of its soundness from the
" Cf. Wright v. Henkel; Muller's Case, both supra note 6; In re Dubroca, 33 F. (2d)
i81 (E. D. Pa. 1929) (all cases holding that where criminality in thd asylum is necessary
criminality by the laws of the state of asylum is sufficient).
' It might be suggested that the "asylum" in such cases should be the entire country, and
the "law" to be considered should be, not that of a particular jurisdiction, but that generally
recognized in the various states. Such a procedure, however, would be contrary, at least by
implication, to the great weight of judicial opinion (see cases supra note 57). Moreover,
since opinions might readily differ in each case as to what the "general law" of a country is,
great difficulties would be encountered in practice, and almost as much uncertainty would
result in administering the treaties as if each state were regarded as the asylum.
1- Cf. Re McCartney, 8 Man. L. R. 367 (Can. i89i) ; In re Murphy, 22 A. R. 386 (Can.
1895).

NOTES

point of view of treaty construction, is a progressive step in the development of
international extradition."0 It is to be hoped that the government will not nullify
its effect by insisting upon express provisions in future treaties requiring criminalty in the asylum, but that it will instead clarify its position by requiring stipulations to the contrary.
B.E.

"MUTUALITY"

AS A REQUIREMENT FOR

SET-OFF

IN PENNSYLVANIA-

Thacher's Estate,1 recently decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
focuses attention once more upon a problem which has been the subject of continual litigation since the founding of the Commonwealth. "A cardinal rule in
the interpretation of statutes of set-off requires that there be mutuality of demand
2
This
both as regards the quality of the right, and the identity of the parties."
is the classic statement of the applicable formula. When this "mutuality" exists
is a problem which the formula does not solve. A brief review of the origin of
set-off in this state and the purposes for which the right was created will throw
light on the subsequent catalogue and evaluation of the solutions achieved by the
courts of Pennsylvania.
Set-off, in Pennsylvania as elsewhere, is dual in origin. On the one hand
there is the Defalcation Act of 1705, which authorizes set-off in legal actions
if two or more dealing together be indebted to each other . . ." -

". ..

On the

other is the power of Equity, recognized and exercised long before any statutes
on the matter, to order the payment of the balance only, where mutual debts were
found to exist. 4 The recognition of the persistence of the equity power after the
passage of the statute is a matter of peculiar importance; and it was expressed
very early in what is one of the most frequently cited passages in this branch of
Pennsylvania law:
"Set off, itself, was originally nothing more than an equitable defence,
which the legislature has thought fit, in plain and simple cases, to subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of common law, reserving to chancery, its
original jurisdiction of cross demands, which do not fall within the statute.
That such a statute should have been thought necessary here, where the
jurisdiction of the courts is compounded of law and equity, is attributable to
the unsettled state of the practice at the time. As their equitable jurisdiction
is now settled, and universally understood, the courts would be competent
to do complete justice, without the statute, as is shown by their having frcquently gone beyond it." r
But even while declaring that Equity exercises a different and broader power
to order set-off than that authorized at law by the statute, the courts have not
hesitated to allow the equitable defense in legal actions." It follows that the
'The progressiveness of the United States in the field of extradition seems to be traditional. See the gracious compliment of Clarke, the English authority, op. cit. supra note I,
at 27.

1311 Pa. 278,

166 At. 873 (1933).
'Stuart v. Commonwealth, 8 Watts 74, 75 (Pa. 1839).

a2 STAT. AT LARGE PA. 241 (1705).
"See Lloyd, The Development of Set-Off (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 541, 547.
'Gibson, J., in Frantz v. Brown, I P. & W. 257, 261 (Pa. 183o) ; see Hibert v. Lang,
65 Pa. 439, 441, 3o Atl. OO4, IOO5 (1895).
'M{urray v. Williamson, 3 Binn. 135 (Pa. 183o); Krause v. Beitel, 3 Rawle 199 (Pa.
1831) ; Hibert v. Lang, supra note 5; Craighead v. Swartz, 219 Pa. 149, 67 Atl. lOO3 (19o7).
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Defalcation Act, which purported to create the right of set-off at law, may with
safety be ignored by the law courts, since the powers which it confers are included
in the broader equitable powers which these same courts have assumed. No
court, therefore, can justify its refusal to allow set-off merely by reference to
the Act.
But to say that the limitations of the statute do not restrict the judicial power
is not to say that there are no bounds to that power, or that each problem will be
referred for solution to the chancellor's sense of natural justice. Whatever the
word may mean, some requirement of "mutuality" still remains. Obviously, D
will not be permitted to plead, in an action by P, that P owes money to X, a
stranger.7 On the other hand it is equally well settled, despite an occasional
dictum.,to the contrary, that the debts proposed to be set off need not be such that8
the defendant might maintain a cross action in his own name against the plaintiff.
The considerations which determine where, between these two positions, the
line should be drawn are or should be those which led both courts and the legislature to create the right of set-off.
idea that an
"Two distinct motives may be detected; one based on the
9
injustice is done the defendant in refusing him this privilege, the other that
unnecessary lawsuits are a nuisance.' 0 The predominance of the latter
notion leads to enactments favoring affirmative relief for the defendant ;"the predominance of the former to purely defensive actions." 12
To decide whether an "injustice is done the defendant" in refusing set-off
requires consideration of the possibility of greater injustice to third parties if the
privilege is granted-an injustice, for example, to the general creditors of an
insolvent plaintiff against whom the set-off is asserted. It is here that a curious
confusion has entered into the discussion of "mutuality". Logically, of course,
whether A and B are mutually indebted is a question independent of the solvency
of either. Yet where the issue is "mutuality", the cases have reckoned insolvency
as a factor, though they are by no means in agreement on its effect.'2 Nowhere
Cf. Longafelt v. Bartsher, 3 P. & W. 492 (Pa. 1832); Russ v. Sadler, 197 Pa. 51, 46
Ati. 903 (19oo).

The former case presents in a very interesting manner the fundamental

generalization that the debts to be set off must be owed by the plaintiff and to the defendant.
' Murray v. Williamson, supra note 6, is a strong and explicit statement of this principle,
for recent reiterations of which see Gordon v. Union Trust Co., 308 Pa. 493, 496, 162 AtI.

293, 294 (1932) ; United States Bank & Trust Co. Case, 311 Pa. 320, 324, 166 At. 871, 872
(1933) ; Lewis, Set Off in Insolvency (1933) 17 PA. B. A. Q. 136. But see Watson v. Hen-

sel, 7 Watts 344, 346 (Pa. 1838).
'The argument being that the only amount really owing is the balance. See 3 STORY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (I4th ed. 19iS) § 1868; Murray v. Williamson, supra note 6, at 137.
The Defalcation Act adopted this theory, for it speaks of the set-off as so much "paid",
authorizes the defalcation to be introduced under the plea of "payment", and provides that

where the defalcation exceeds the sum demanded, the plaintiff being "over paid", judgment
may be entered against him for the difference.
" See Potter v. Burd, 4 Watts I5, I8 (Pa. 1835) ; Tustin v. Cameron, 5 Whart. 379, 380
(Pa. 1839) where the court stated: "It is the practicability of avoiding circuity and needless
costs with safety and convenience to all parties, which determines the question of setoff ..

I Pennsylvania was the first common law jurisdiction to permit a recovery by the defendant against the plaintiff when his counterclaim exceeded the plaintiff's demand. See Lloyd,
supra note 4, at 557.
"Ibid.
"Favoring set-off because of insolvency: Lewis v. Culbertson, ii S. & R. 48 (Pa. 1824);
Stewart v. Coulter, 12 S. & R. 252, at 446 (Pa. 1824). Insolvency as a factor against setoff: see Singerley v. Swain's Adm'rs, 33 Pa. 102, 105 (1859) ; Stephens v. Cotterell, 99 Pa.
The general rule elsewhere is in favor of set-off. See LAWRENCE, EQUITY
188, 192 (i881).
JURISPRUDENCE (1929) § 1077; WATERMAN, Ss'r-OFF (1869) §§ 395, 396. Cf. Note (1928)
76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 314, 317, and Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. Rmv. 42o, 428.
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in the Pennsylvania cases is it regarded as a circumstance of more than secondary
import; and, as a matter of fact, it seems usually to have been employed to confirm whatever conclusion the court had previously reached.
In so treating insolvency, the courts have subordinated a primary element
in the problem of equitable set-off. Whether or not a defendant, allowed to set
off against an insolvent plaintiff, receives a technical "preference", it cannot be
doubted that practically he is much better off than other creditors. Applying the
maxim that "Equality is Equity", it would seem to follow that insolvency should
invariably defeat set-off. But that A must pay B one hundred cents on the
dollar, leaving B, as a general creditor of A, only a dividend in insolvency, was
the very situation the unfairness of which led to the creation of the right of setoff. Against this long and well recognized specific equity the maxim, as usual,
is unavailing. When, however, the court goes beyond this very situation, where
the indebtedness is actually mutual, and, for example, permits co-defendants to
set off an obligation due one of them, such set-off is allowed not because of any
unfairness in making A pay B in full, while C recovers from B only a dividend,
but to avoid needless multiplicity of actions. Since the burden of bringing an
extra action is not to be compared to the money loss suffered by the general
creditors of an insolvent when a preference is allowed, the conclusion is inevitable
that in all cases except where, regarding the real parties at interest, strict mutuality exists, insolvency should bar set-off. Nevertheless, an examination of the
decisions discloses that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in common with the
appellate courts of many other jurisdictions, has failed to make this or in fact
any significant analysis of the general problem involved.
One of the first situations in which the court was called upon to deal with
the question of "mutuality" was the action to recover a legacy to a ferne covert,
the executors pleading as set-off a debt owed by the husband. The decisions
reflect the law of domestic relations rather than set-off; but the results are nevertheless of interest here because they forecast the difficulty which the court was
later to experience in distinguishing between the nominal and real parties at interest in order to determine whether there were mutual debts between the latter. At
a time when the husband was not merely a necessary party, procedurally, in the
wife's action, but in fact the "substantial owner of the wife's share", it is not
surprising that the court allowed the husband's debt to be set off.14 Where the
husband died,"5 or was divorced, 16 before the wife brought action to recover her
share, the set-off was properly refused, since although the husband had the
uncontrolled power of disposing of his wife's choses-in-action during the continuance of the marital relation, at its termination they survived to her absolutely.
Consistently, it was held that where he never had this power of disposal, as where
the legacy was "for her own use", set-off of the husband's debt should be refused.' 7 With the gradual recognition of married women's property rights the
problem has become academic. Husband and wife are now treated as strangers
for set-off purposes. s
Another set of cases which early came up for decision can be represented
by two type cases: (i) A and B sue C, who sets off a claim on A; (2) X sues Y
and Z, who set off a claim due Y. No proposition is better settled than that
which permits set-off in the latter situation,'" though this is not the law in other
" Yohe v. Barnett, i Binn. 358 (Pa. i8o8) ; Wishart v. Downey, 15 S. & R. 77 (Pa.

1826) ; Lowman's Appeal, 3 W. & S. 349 (Pa. 1842).

Flory v. Becker, 2 Pa. 470 (1846).
"0Fink v. Hake, 6 Watts 131 (Pa. 1837).
"Jamison v. Brady, 6 S. & R. 466 (Pa. 1821).
Bentz v. Bentz, 95 Pa. 216 (188o) ; Litle's Est., 244 Pa. 368, 9o Atl. 73 (9).
"Robinson v. Beall, 3 Yeates 267 (Pa. i8ox); Childerston v. Hammon, 9 S. & R. 68
(Pa. 1822) ; Miller v. Kreiter, 76 Pa. 78 (1874).
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jurisdictions. 20 Set-off is refused in the former case; and the distinction is quite
proper, since it is one thing to allow Z, if he will, to pay the debt of his codefendant, but quite another to permit C to assert, as payment of the claim of A
and B, his claim on A. 1 B's objection to such an attempt, which in effect would
compel him to accept the debt of A for that of C, is not unwarranted. Similarly,
the defendant may not set off against an individual plaintiff a claim due jointly
by plaintiff and others, since plaintiff has the right to have his co-obligors joined
in an action on their common obligation. 2 A very interesting case k propos the
problem of setting off joint and separate claims is Watson v. Hensel." A guardian sued to the use of three children on a mortgage which was part of the estate
of their father, who died intestate. The defendant wished to set off valid several
claims for the support of each child. The court refused, on the ground that "It
is a joint demand by several plaintiffs, and certainly a separate claim by the
defendant against each cannot be set off for the want of that mutuality which is
absolutely essential. A set-off is in the nature of a cross-suit, and it cannot be
pretended that a joint suit would lie against the infants by the present defendants." 24 Three years later, counsel for plaintiff cited Watson v. Hensel
against set-off in the following situation: A obtained judgment against B, and
assigned part to C, the rest to D. In an action by A to the use of C and D, B
wished to set off several claims on the use plaintiffs. Here, too, a joint suit could
not have been brought by the defendant. But the court, without discussing
Watson v. Hensel, very properly allowed the set-off." Here, if ever, the policy
of avoiding unnecessary lawsuits, embodied in the right of set-off, applies.
Perhaps the farthest case in this field is Hibert v. Lang,'8 where defendant
was permitted to set off a claim due a several co-obligor, not sued, with the consent of the latter. The decision comes perilously close to a holding that the
defendant may set off any claim on the plaintiff, provided he gets the consent of
the owner of that claim and no third party's interest is injuredIT The reasoning,
however, confines the holding to its own facts, the court arguing that since the
several co-obligor might have asserted his set-off had the obligee chosen to sue
him, and since in a suit by the defendant for contribution the co-obligor would
have no set-off, the plaintiff may not, by electing to sue one, deprive the other of
the opportunity to set off. It is interesting to speculate on the result the court
would have reached had the plaintiff been insolvent, in view of the reasoning it
gives in support of its holding.
On principle, the set-off of partnership claims is analogous to the cases just
discussed; but the question has come up on different party alignments: the usual
case in the preceding group was an attempt by several defendants to set off an
obligation due one of them, while the commonest partnership case is that in which
one defendant desires to set off a claim due himself and others as partners. He
WATERMAN, op. cit. mspra note 13, § 383.
' Bentz v. Bentz, supra note 18. The argument given is from Wrenshall v. Cook, 7
Watts 464, 465 (Pa. 1838).
Mintz v. Tri-County Natural Gas Co., 259 Pa. 477, 103 Atl. 285 (ii8).
Supra note 8.
Id. at 346. It is obvious that the interests o~f the children in the mortgage were several, though asserted together in the name of the guardian who had legal title.
'Hugg v. Brown, 6 Whart. 468 (Pa. 184) ; cf. Smith v. Myler, 22 Pa. 36 (1853)
(permitting one of the holders of a joint note to use it as set-off to the extent of his interest
therein).
' Supra note 5. But cf. Henderson v. Lewis, 9 S. & R. 379 (Pa. 1823), which is more
nearly in conflict than the court in Hibert v. Lang is willing to admit.
' Should the law ever reach this position-and no good reason against it suggests itself
to the writer-we should have a legal doctrine analogous to the equitable "clean hands" principle: One who wishes to collect his debts in legal actions must pay his own just obligations.

2 Cf. 57 C. J. 455;

NOTES
has been permitted to do so where the consent of the partners is shown,2" although
an individual defendant can set off neither a claim on the partnership against a
partner's demand,29 nor a claim on a partner against a partnership demand.3"
The case of the surviving partner is of especial interest because the two decisions
on the point present a neat logical contradiction. Where the surviving partner
was suing on a partnership claim, his personal debt was not available to the
defendant as set-off; 31 but where he was being sued on a partnership obligation,
he was permitted to set off his private demand on the plaintiff.2 2 Justice Gibson's
observation in the former case that "though a surviving partner may chose [sic]
to treat a partnership debt as due him in his own right, it does not follow that a
defendant . . . has a correspondent right" 3 3 presents the interesting but unacceptable proposition that the "mutuality" of two claims may depend on the will
of one of the parties.
A situation in which repeated failures seem not to have discouraged further
efforts to obtain set-off is represented in Union Bank v. CanonsburgIron Co. 4
Defendant paid his note to plaintiff with a check on a bank, which failed before
paying. In a suit on the note, defendant wished to set off a debt of the plaintiff
to the bank. The argument "I won't pay you because you won't pay my debtor"
has a non-rational appeal which can be overcome only by a realization of the
confusion which would result from accepting it. In the ordinary action on a
note, the court and jury must determine the validity of one claim. Where defendant pleads set-off, two claims must be tried and their "mutuality" determined.
But if it may be pleaded as set-off that plaintiff hasn't paid defendant's debtor,
three distinct claims must be tried, even excluding the possibility that plaintiff
may have the same sort of set-off against his creditor that defendant asserts
against the plaintiff. The policy of avoiding circuity of actions certainly does not
extend so far. 3 The rule which permits a surety to set off a debt due his insolvent principal2 0 must be regarded as an exception to this on grounds which can
be allocated to surety law.37 Where, however, principal and surety are sued
jointly, the case is treated
like the ordinary one of joint defendants setting off a
38
debt due one of them.

The few cases in which the court has considered the right of a garnishee to
set off against the garnishor a demand on their mutual debtor have been confused
by the presence of other factors; but generally, the privilege has been denied.39
One would have expected the opposite result since the garnishee is ordinarily
liable to the garnishor only as the former would have been liable to the person
whose funds are attached.
A case much more frequent and important in present-day litigation than any
heretofore discussed involves the "mutuality" of claims by and against trustees.
Where the trustee is plaintiff, and the obligation in suit is part of the trust estat6,
'Tustin v. Cameron, sapra note 10; Montz v. Morris, 89 Pa. 392 (1879) ; Edelman v.
Scholl, 65 Pa. Super. 357 (1916).
M'Dowell v. Tyson, 14 S. & R. 3oo (Pa. 1826).
'Archer v. Dunn, 2W. & S. 327 (Pa. 3843).
"Waln v. Hewes, 5 S. & R. 468 (Pa. 182o).
Lewis v. Culbertson, supra note 13.
'Waln v. Hewes, supra note 31, at 471.
'6 At. 577 (Pa. 1886).
'Accord: Carman v. Garrison, 13 Pa. 158 (185o); Longafelt v. Bartsher; Russ v.
Sadler, both supra note 7.
"Craighead v. Swartz, supra note 6; cf. Hibert v. Lang, supra note 5.

'See

ARANT, SuREYSHlIP AND GUARANTY (1931)

210, 213;

WATERMAN, Op Cit.

su1pra

note 13, §§ 237, 238.
Balsley v. Hoffman, 13 Pa. 603 (385o).
Crammond v. Bank of United States, i Binn. 64 (Pa. 1803) ; Reed v. Penrose's Ex'rs,
36 Pa. 214 (x86o) ; Lorenz's Adm'rs v. King, 38 Pa. g3 (i86o).
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the defendant may set off claims on the cestui que trust, but not claims on the
4
plaintiff personally. " Where the trustee is defendant, he cannot set off a claim
42
in his own right against his liability as trustee, nor a claim as trustee against
43
In the first situation there would seem to be no reason,
his personal liability.
where the plaintiff is solvent, why the trustee should not be permitted to pay a
liability of the estate with his personal asset. The beneficiary could not suffer
from the substitution of the trustee as creditor of the estate instead of the plaintiff, who is already in court asking for his money. In the second situation, the
reasons usually given for denying set-off, aside from a perfunctory statement
that mutuality is lacking, are (i) "The manifest effect of allowing a set-off
to
would be to enable a debtor to pay a debt of his own with money belonging
45
The
other people"; 44 (2) an implied contract to waive the right of set-off.
latter may be dismissed with the comment that if the facts justify such an implication the reason is valid, but that its indiscriminate use suggests that "implied
contract" is a mere rationalization of the result. The former is an unhappy
expression of a perfectly valid reason for refusing set-off. The expression is
unfortunate because it is unrealistic in its connotation of embezzlement in a
situation where, as a matter of fact, the trustee is usually engaged in a laudable
attempt to effect a quick and complete salvage of the cestui's asset by asserting
it as set-off. The valid reason, imperfectly expressed, is that if the set-off is
permitted the trustee would become debtor to the estate, a situation, the practical
undesirability of which is cearly recognized in the law of trusts.", Of course,
where the plaintiff is insolvent, set-off should be refused on this ground alone,
since no strict mutuality exists.
Agents have been treated like trustees for set-off purposes, and for the same
reasons, to wit: an implied undertaking to waive set-off;47 and a desire not to
permit the defendant to "blend" his personal and fiduciary business. 48 It may
be observed, however, that where a principal, owing his agent money, puts the
latter in funds to be applied to a particular purpose, the implication of a waiver
of set-off is not far-fetched. 49

"Childerston v. Hammon, supra note 19.
"United States Bank & Trust Co. Case, supra note 8.
"Kelter v. American Bankers Fin. Co., 306 Pa. 483, i6o At. 127 (1932). But cf. Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co. (No. i), 25o Pa. 372, 95 Atl. 574 (1915) (where the
only distinguishing feature was the fact that if there was a trust, the funds had been mingled
by the defendant with its general ,funds, certainly not a factor which should favor the defendant).
"Hunter v. Henning, 259 Pa. 347, lO3 Ati. 61 (i918) ; Gordon v. Union Trust Co., swtpra
note 8. For discussion of these cases see Lewis, supra note 8, at 137; Note (928) 76 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 314, 317.
"Hunter v. Henning, supra note 43, at 354, lO3 Atl. at 63.
'Valley Butter Co. v. Minnesota Cooperative Creameries, 300 Pa. lO2, 15o AtI. 157
(193o) ; cf. Marshall v. Brainerd, 253 Pa. 35, 40, 97 Atl. 3057, O58 (1916).
, 0 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) Tentative Draft No. I, § 75.

"Russell v. First Presb. Church, 65 Pa. 9 (187o) ; Tagg v. Bowman, 99 Pa. 376 (1882);
Shearman v. Morrison, 149 Pa. 386, 24 Atl. 313 (1892) ; Hostetter v. Giffen, 268 Pa. 530, 112
Atl. 150 (920).

'See Wilson v. Lewistown, I W. & S. 428, 432 (Pa. 1841) (school tax collector sued
by borough for amount of taxes collected not allowed to set-off for work done by him on the
school houses).
'Bache v. Philips, 155 Pa. 303, 25 At]. 891 (1893), is worthy of note as a case where
the court not only did not recognize the existence of an agency, but also denied set-off in a
situation where, looking at the real parties at interest, there was actual mutuality. Holmes
v. German Security Bank, 87 Pa. 525 (1878), which was relied upon, presents the curious
doctrine that the issue of a draft and bill of lading against goods forwarded to an agent for
sale is an "appropriation" of the proceeds of the sale, after notice of which the agent cannot
apply such proceeds to his own claim on the shipper, by way of set-off.

NOTES

It is in the cases of decedents' estates-the right of set-off by and against
executors and administrators-that the court has gone farthest astray by employing a set of tenuous technical distinctions in the determination of that elusive
element "mutuality". The obvious proposition was early adjudicated that debts
owed by the deceased and claims due him in his lifetime were mutual, though
death substituted an executor in the procedural position of defending and asserting these obligations.5 0 An unobjectionable amplification of this rule permitted
51
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debt due the deceased was transmuted after his death into a bond naming the
executors as payees.5 3
From this point on there is little but confusion. As against two cases holding that an executor cannot set off against a dfstributee's claim of a share in the
estate the distributee's debt to the executor personally,5 4 there is the extraordinary
case of Krause v. Beitel, where the set-off was permitted despite the presence of
three other adverse factors.55 In contrast with the incomprehensible rule that
when an executor sells goods of the estate, or by any other act acquires a cause
of action on behalf of the estate which the 8deceased never had, the defendant
may not set off a debt owed by the deceased, stands a decision like Solliday v.
Bissey, where in an action against the executors of the estate of A, they were
permitted to set off rent due from the plaintiff to the defendants as executors of
the estate of B on a lease made after B's death." The cases cited above rs fall
into error by using too literally a statement invented for a very different purpose.
From a desire to remove all legal obstacles in the way of actions by executors on
claims due the estate, "it has been said, they are the personal property of the
executors; that naming them executors is only surplusage, &c." 5o Consequently,
it is argued, these obligations are not held "in the same right", as obligations due
to and from the decedent. It is impossible to justify decisions resting on nothing
more substantial than this bit of loose language.
Where the executor claims in his right as such, no good reason can be
adduced for refusing to set off a claim on the decedent or his estate. The case is
not merely one which should appeal to Equity; it seems, rather, one of the few
situations to reach litigation where actual mutuality in the statutory sense exists.
The survey which has just been concluded reveals three important conditions
to be remedied in Pennsylvania set-off law. Perhaps the most important is the
'Boyd v. Thompson, z Yeates 217 (Pa. 1797) ; Murray v. Williamson, supra note 6.
"Manifold's Est., 5 W. & S. 340 (Pa. 1843).
'roHicks v. National Bank, 168 Pa. 638, 32 Atl. 63 (1895). The English rule is other-

wise. See 2 WI. Ias,

ExECUToRs (12th ed. 193o) 1230.

CGrist v. Brindle, 2 Rawle 121 (Pa. 1828).
r Bradshaw's Appeal, .3 Grant's Cases lO9 (Pa. 1861); cf. Lorenz's Adm'rs v. King,
supra note 39; Waln v. Hewes, spra note 31 (in this case the claim was by a judgment creditor against defendant as executor of the estate).
r Krause v. Beitel, supra note 6. The other factors were: (i) The set-off was a debt
due one of joint defendants; (2) It was the debt of the husband while the plaintiff's action
was for a legacy to the wife; (3) The husband was insolvent.
'0Wolfersberger v. Bucher, io S. & R. 1o (Pa. 1823); Singerly v. Swain's Adm'rs;
Stephens v. Cotterell, both supra note 13; see Thacher's Est., supra note i, at 281, I66 Atl. at
874; ef. Stuart v. Commonwealth, supra note 2. The converse, that executors cannot set off
in an action against them on a debt owed by the deceased, claims on the plaintiff acquired
after the death of the deceased, is held in Darroch v. Adm'rs of Hay, 2 Yeates

208

(Pa.

1797) ; Potter v. Burd, supra note io.
cf. Steinmeyer v. Ewalt Bridge Co., 189 Pa. 145, 42 Atl. 132
" 12 Pa. 347 (1849);
(i8g) (executors sue for stock dividend declared after decedent's death; defendants allowed
to set off obligation of deceased) ; Thacher's Est., supra note i.
s Supra note 56.
C
Grist v. Brindle, supra note 53, points out the error.
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failure of the court, in administering an equitable remedy, to take a consistent
position on the effect of insolvency. Second is the refusal to recognize actual
mutuality, notably in the case of the executor. Third is a persistent attachment
to the magic word "mutuality", the tag to be affixed when the court permits
set-off, the stern law to which the defendant is referred when set-off is denied.
The word obscures the real issue in most of the cases-how far it is desirable to
carry out the policy of avoiding unnecessary actions.
Thacher's Estate6 0 offered an admirable opportunity to review and reorganize. The receivers of an insolvent bank sued defendant as executor on a note
of the deceased. The deceased, at his death, had on deposit with the bank
$6711.89. The defendant withdrew this, redeposited it in his own name as
executor, and subsequently, until the bank's insolvency, made deposits and withdrawals. The defendant sought to set off the balance remaining in the account
at the time of the bank's insolvency against his liability on the note. The court
permitted the set-off in an unanalytical opinion containing two regrettable sentences literally declaring the immateriality of reason or logic in Pennsylvania
set-off law. 61 The result reached was correct, but inconsistent with earlier decisions 612 for the executor's claim on account of the deposit was not one which the
deceased ever had.63 The same holding with a recognition of the inconsistency
would have made the case vastly more valuable as the starting point for a much
needed revision of set-off law in this state.
L.B.S.
' Supra note i.

' Supra note I, at 282, 166 Ati. at 874.
and cases cited in note 56.
" See text supra page
,' Crist v. Brindle, supra note 53, is a possible authority for Thacher's Est., regarding the
bank's liability to the executor as a mere reincarnation of its quondam liability to the deceased. But the analogy fails when the executor's subsequent deposits and withdrawals are
considered.

